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EVOLVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
STANDARDS FOR HEALTHCARE 
NONPROFITS: IS BOARD OF DIRECTOR 
COMPENSATION A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY? 
Mark S. Blodgett,* Linda J. Melconian,** and Jason H. Peterson*** 
This Article reviews the historic, ethical, and legal foundations of 
fiduciary duty and nonprofit corporate governance. It then addresses the 
current nonprofit healthcare governance issue of Board compensation. The 
data collected contrasts the amounts of nonprofit healthcare and for-profit 
healthcare compensation. This Article argues that nonprofit Board 
compensation may breach fiduciary duty and compromise public policy. 
The authors conclude that concerns about nonprofit Board compensation 
are warranted and propose legislative reform. 
Ought the executive department of a great voluntary society, for missions 
or for any similar enterprise, to be really and formally responsible to 
anybody? . . .  
. . . . 
A true responsibility of the executive to some superior or constituent 
power is a security against mismanagement and the gradual perversion of 
the trust . . . . Great perversions of trust[] . . . occur. . . for the most part 
unconsciously, gradually, and with best intentions.1               
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 1. Leonard Bacon, Responsibility in the Management of Societies, 5 THE NEW ENGLANDER 
28, 29, 32, 33 (1847). Yale professor, Leonard Bacon, studied nonprofit governance and published 
an article on fiduciary accountability to the public. Id. He asserted that Board members, as 
fiduciaries, are accountable to a higher power of morality and that they must disclose their 
activities. Id. This fiduciary responsibility was thus also an individual responsibility as the 
manager of others’ property. Id. This high standard of fiduciary accountability was necessary to 
prevent public hostility. Id.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit organizations exist everywhere in American society.2 These 
voluntary associations comprise nearly 10 percent of the U.S. economy and 
consist of three major categories: health care, education, and human 
services.3 Over time, nonprofit governance has evolved, reflecting 
modifications and conflicts in the interpretation and application of the legal 
and ethical doctrine of fiduciary duty.4 These changes have eroded the 
uniqueness of nonprofit Board of Director (BOD or Board) leadership. In a 
new era of nonprofit governance, the current permissive practice of 
nonprofit Director compensation5 may vitiate volunteerism and breach 
fiduciary duty.6 Today, numerous and similar occurrences of malfeasance 
blur distinctions between nonprofit (e.g., United Way) and for-profit (e.g., 
Enron) governance.7 Breach of fiduciary duty has generally triggered 
corporate wrongdoing; for nonprofits, it has betrayed the public trust.8  
                                                                                                                 
 2. Alex de Tocqueville, the 19th century French observer of American society, wrote about 
the uniqueness of democratic American institutions: “Americans of all ages, all stations in life, 
and all types of dispositions . . . are forever forming associations.” 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 129 (ed. Francis Bowen, trans. Henry Reeve, Esq., Cambridge: Sever 
& Francis 1863) (1840). He asserted that such voluntary associations were necessary for a stable 
democracy where “all citizens are equally independent and cannot rely on a powerful central 
government to dictate values or dispense charity.” Id.; see also AMY S. BLACKWOOD ET AL., 
URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND 
VOLUNTEERING, 2012, at 2 tbl.1 (2012).  
 3. See William Byrnes, A Short History of the Nonprofit Sector, CALIFORNIA ASS’N OF 
NONPROFITS, http://web.archive.org/web/20100813084043/http:/www.canonprofits.org/index.php 
?option=com_content&view=article&id=254&Itemid=107 (last visited June 10, 2013); Karla 
Taylor, Changing Expectations for Nonprofit Governance, 57 ASS’N MGMT 64, 64 (2005). The 
three major nonprofit categories listed above break down as follows: education (18.1 percent); 
health (13.2 percent); and human services (33.7 percent). PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, 
STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 11 (2005) 
[hereinafter STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY]. For example, health care nonprofits include 60 
percent of community hospitals, all community health centers, nearly 30 percent of nursing 
homes, approximately 17 percent of home health care agencies, and 40 percent of all private 
health insurance enrollees. See Byrnes, supra.  
 4. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987) (amended 2008).  
 5. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3351(c), 3363.6(c) (2010).  
 6. See infra notes 72 and 106 and accompanying text; see also REV. MODEL NONPROFIT 
CORP. ACT; An Act Regulating Compensation of Board Members of Public Charities: Hearing on 
H. 3516 Before the J. Comm’n on the Judiciary, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011) [hereinafter 
Peregrine Testimony] (testimony from Michael W. Peregrine, Esq., on behalf of Tufts Health 
Plan). 
 7. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime 
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 357, 357–69 (2003) (discussing the Enron scandal); 
Karen Donnelly, Comment, Good Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of 
Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 
163, 173–74 (2010) (discussing scandals in the independent sector, including United Way, 
American Red Cross, Nature Conservancy, and American University); Christyne J. Vachon, 
Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care and Loyalty as Nonprofits Move into 
Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 37, 42–43 (2011) (discussing how 
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Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an attempt to regulate 
fiduciary breaches within for-profit organizations; yet for nonprofits, it has 
thus far merely initiated a nonprofit dialogue with a review and 
recommendations in two major reports.9 The result of these efforts has 
focused much attention on nonprofit Board accountability, disclosure, and 
transparency that includes more specific issues of nonprofit ethical 
responsibility, fiduciary duty, internal financial controls, fraud, and 
excessive executive compensation.10 It appears that Congress has generally 
left nonprofit regulation to the states, and the states are beginning to 
respond.11 However, while states may pass statutes to address nonprofit best 
governance practices and reform, these laws may also contribute to a further 
blurring of the nonprofit distinction by permitting “reasonable” BOD 
compensation.12 Such permissive practice of Board compensation erodes 
the public trust.13 
Public trust underscores the historic uniqueness of “a great voluntary 
society,” and our ubiquitous nonprofit organizations.14 Yet it also 
emphasizes the responsibility with which they are managed.15 These 
voluntary associations exist pursuant to the U.S. Constitution’s First 
Amendment Right to Assemble, a hallmark of American democracy.16 
Moreover, they self-govern free from state legislative control and for the 
public benefit.17 Thus, the nonprofit governance standard derives from the 
                                                                                                                 
nonprofits and for-profit businesses are becoming similar with regard to corporate governance and 
corporate malfeasance). 
 8. See Bacon, supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Mark S. Blodgett and Linda J. 
Melconian, Health-care Nonprofits: Enhancing Governance and Public Trust, BUSINESS AND 
SOCIETY REVIEW 117:2, 197–219 (2012). 
 9. See infra note 138. Both reports to Congress show not only the urgency of nonprofit 
issues, but also the lack of congressional action and oversight. Id.  
 10. Board compensation is the major distinguishing factor within the two reports. It appears in 
the 2007 report but not 2005. See infra note 138.  
 11. See infra notes 114 and 104. Among the states, at least Massachusetts and New York 
appear to be considering ethical reforms. See id.; see also infra note 114.  The Massachusetts 
AG’s Office has also noted that “compensating Directors is contrary to [a charitable] spirit and 
diverts resources otherwise focused on achieving the charitable mission of the organization.” See 
infra note 24, at 3.  
 12. See infra note 103.  
 13. Rachel Penski, Note, The Case of CEO Richard Grasso and the NYSE: Proposals for 
Controlling Executive Compensation at Public Nonprofit Corporations, 58 VAND. L. REV. 339, 
340 (2005) (discussing public outcry over the NYSE’s CEO’s excessive compensation package).  
 14. See Bacon, supra note 1, at 29.  
 15. See id., at 29–30.  
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.” Id.  
 17. This process began with the founding of Harvard College (Hall) and culminated in 
Dartmouth v. Woodwood. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 661 (1819).  
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application of the highest morality as a “security against mismanagement” 
first enunciated by Yale scholar Leonard Bacon in 1831.18 
This Article reviews the governance of nonprofits as it evolved through 
our constitutional guarantees and case law.19 It then examines the changing 
governance standards of fiduciary duty in comparison to for-profit 
organizations, the more recent emphasis on the fiduciary duty of obedience, 
and the status of current state regulatory reforms and legislative proposals.20 
Investigation of nonprofit BOD compensation as outlined in Appendix A 
reveals that, within the three major categories of nonprofit organizations, a 
number of healthcare nonprofits are currently compensating their Board 
members at modest levels compared to their for-profit counterparts. 
Part A of the analysis argues that nonprofit healthcare BOD 
compensation may be a breach of fiduciary duty.21 In particular, the 
Massachusetts legislative initiative for regulating Board compensation is 
perhaps to be expected since that State has been in the forefront of the 
historical evolution of U.S. state nonprofit governance.22 Part B of the 
analysis argues that BOD compensation is inefficient and unwarranted 
within the nonprofit healthcare industry.23 In Part C, this Article concludes 
by noting that the blurring of nonprofit and for-profit governance may 
violate historical and ethical principles of the nonprofit public benefit; 
therefore, states should establish a presumption that prohibits nonprofit 
Board compensation and that can be rebutted only with the most rigorous 
justification as developed by the respective States’ Attorneys General 
(AGs).24 The justification should include a measurable connection between 
the charitable mission of the nonprofit and Board performance. 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See Bacon, supra note 1, at 32.  
 19. See Byrnes, supra note 3.  
 20. See Appendix A: Healthcare Nonprofit Board Compensation, infra p. 31. 
 21. There is likely no intention to breach fiduciary duty, but rather a manifestation of Bacon’s 
admonition about unconscious and gradual perversion of the public trust. See Bacon, supra note 1, 
at 32–33; Peter D. Hall, A History of Nonprofit Boards in the United States, BOARDSOURCE 3 
(2003), http://beech.ait.fredonia.edu/nfp/ReadingRoom/PDFs/BoardSource-AHistoryOfNonprofit 
BoardsInTheUnitedStates.pdf (last visited June 10, 2013) (describing examples of nonprofits that 
unconsciously and unintentionally breached their fiduciary duties). 
 22. See infra notes 113–124 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 172–188 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Letter from David G. Spackman, Chief of Non-Profit Org./Pub. Charities Div. Mass. 
Att’y Gen., to Barry L. Shemin, Chair of Bd. of Dir., Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Davey Scoon, 
Chair of Bd. of Dir., Tufts Health Plan, David W. Hillis, Chair of Bd. of Dir., Fallon Cmty. Health 
Plan, and Paul Guzzi, Chair of Bd. of Dir., Blue Cross Blue Shield of MA (Apr. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter Spackman Letter], available at http://www.charitableplanning.com/cpc_1821517-
1.pdf (creating a justification for such a presumption based on the compensation practices of the 
nonprofits discovered by Massachusetts AG Coakley).  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. COLONIAL AND STATE HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNANCE FOR THE 
PUBLIC GOOD 
The historic roots of U.S. nonprofits originated in Elizabethan 
England.25 The British Parliament first granted the right to assemble to 
healthcare and education organizations benefitting the public good.26 This 
right to form associations also included a tax-exempt status.27 Many 
colonial legislatures followed Parliament’s common law precedent as 
nonprofits evolved into a distinctly American practice of institutional 
governance.28 The Massachusetts Bay Company’s Charter, better known as 
the Mayflower Compact, is an early colonial framework for nonprofit 
charters and self-governance.29 
The founding of Harvard College in colonial Cambridge, Massachusetts 
triggered the evolution of American nonprofit governance with the 
chartering of a corporation whose mission was the public good.30 Its charter, 
like the Mayflower Compact, did not restrict the Board’s powers solely to a 
grant of property; rather, it further delegated self-governance to the Board 
and allowed for perpetual succession.31 While it set precedent for U.S. 
nonprofit Board independence from government control, it further imposed 
a duty on the Board to promote the good of both the institution and the 
public.32 However, Harvard’s managerial autonomy needed further 
clarification, which it attained with the advent of state rather than colonial 
legislative and regulatory powers.33 Dartmouth v. Woodward would 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Byrnes, supra note 3. The 1597 Charitable Corporations Act exempted hospitals from 
taxation and was soon followed by the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, which expanded the scope 
of tax exemption. Id.  It included charities for “maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers, schools 
of learning, free schools and scholars in universities.” Id. These Acts sidestepped traditional 
inheritance law by allowing private and untaxed money to be transferred to the public benefit. Id. 
This included real property that could be transferred to charitable trusts. See id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. See Hall, supra note 21, at 9–10.  
 29. Id. at 4; see also Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate 
Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law From 1619 to 1972 and a 
Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 
231 n.126 (2006). (“Colonists in Massachusetts established the Mayflower compact and only two 
colonies did not include self-governance provisions in their formation: New York and Georgia.”).  
 30. See Hall, supra note 21, at 5–6. The Massachusetts Colonial legislature established 
Harvard College in 1636 by granting a formal charter of incorporation making Harvard 
autonomous and separate from the legislature. Id. This autonomy included management of its 
affairs. Id. Its government structure consisted of officers to manage the corporation and the board 
of public overseers, local ministers, and magistrates, who could veto management decisions. Id.  
 31. See id.  
 32. Id. at 5, 18.  
 33. Id. at 5. Two views of nonprofit Board governance still prevail—the Jeffersonian view and 
the Harvard or common law view. Id. at 9–10, 13. The first is subject to the control of state 
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determine the scope of state authority over nonprofits and BOD 
independence.34 In Dartmouth, the Marshall Court affirmatively established 
the principle that private associations for public benefit are expressions of 
our Constitutional Right to Assemble, free from the “influence of legislative 
bodies, whose fluctuating policy, and repeated interferences, produced the 
most perplexing and injurious embarrassments.”35 Though the Dartmouth 
case appeared to reconcile the legal conflict of nonprofit governance, Board 
accountability continued to vary among states.36 Of course, Massachusetts, 
based on its early history of nonprofit charters, had adopted the common-
law/Harvard model of nonprofit governance that was autonomous from the 
State legislature.37 
Massachusetts continued to take the early lead in shaping state 
nonprofit governance.38 For example, the first standard of nonprofit 
fiduciary duty was enunciated in 1830 in Harvard College v. Amory, in 
which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court established the Prudent 
Man Rule: “All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, . . . to observe 
how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs . 
. . .”39 It was a strict ethical standard expressly prohibiting any Board self-
dealing, or conflict of interest, and it remained the standard for nearly 160 
years for nonprofit organizations committed to public benefit.40 
Additionally, nonprofit Board members served as volunteers, another 
                                                                                                                 
legislatures while the second is based upon the constitutional right to assemble and to guard the 
public’s private rights. Id. at 10.  
 34. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 518 (1819). In 1817, New Hampshire 
acquired Dartmouth College and instituted the Jeffersonian view of nonprofit governance by 
replacing its Board with gubernatorial and legislative appointed overseers. See id. at 626.  
 35. Id. at 648. Congressman and Dartmouth alumnus Daniel Webster argued for the Harvard 
or common law view and the peoples’ right to assemble with Boards serving to protect citizens’ 
private rights. See Hall, supra note 21, at 11–12.  
 36. See Hall, supra note 21, at 13. Virginia followed the Jeffersonian view of state control and 
oversight. Id. at 10, 13. States like Pennsylvania continued to follow the Jeffersonian view by 
applying a “charitableness test,” established in 1980, by which local authorities could balance tax 
exemption benefits against the public benefit. Id. at 13. New York formed a Board of Regents in 
1785 to oversee its nonprofit educational institutions, and in 1990, it replaced the self-dealing 
trustees of Adelphi University. Id.  
 37. See id. at 10.  
 38. See generally Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830) (imposing on the trustees of 
an estate—a nonprofit entity—the “prudent man” rule governing fiduciary duty). 
 39. Id. at 461. In Amory, a widow received a $50,000 estate that diminished to $30,000 at the 
time of her death. Id. at 447. These monies were then claimed by Massachusetts General Hospital 
and Harvard. Id. at 450. Both of these parties sued the estate alleging mismanagement. Id. The 
court excused the trustees of mismanagement and diminution of the estate consistent with the 
Prudent Man Investment Rule. Id. at 461, 465. 
 40. Id.; see also Lynn Foster, G.S. Brant Perkins & Renee Brida, Investments of Estate Assets, 
4 ARK. PROBATE & ESTATE ADMIN. § 12:5 (2012) (beginning in the 1990s, the “prudent investor” 
rule began to overtake the 1830s “prudent person rule”). 
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uniquely distinctive feature of nonprofit organizations serving the public 
good.41 
B. BOARD MEMBER COMPENSATION 
For-profit organizations have traditionally viewed Director 
compensation as an important component of corporate governance within 
the marketplace and generally consider two primary questions with regard 
to compensation: does compensation motivate otherwise qualified 
individuals to serve on corporate Boards and does compensation properly 
align Directors with shareholders’ interests?42 Several additional factors 
beyond compensation, however, can motivate Board service at for-profit 
organizations. For example, Directors are often guided by an altruistic sense 
that there is an inherent obligation to “do the right thing” for the firm.43 
Also, so long as Directors feel that they have the expertise to contribute, 
they will serve regardless of compensation.44 Moreover, the education that 
Directors receive from serving on Boards and working with peers also plays 
a strong role in motivating service.45 Finally, “reputation capital” plays an 
important role.46 Directors who serve on the Boards of successful firms are 
often afforded additional business opportunities and other personal 
recognition beyond merely an intrinsic sense of accomplishment.47 
Nonetheless, compensation does motivate Directors to serve at for-
profit organizations.48 The proper form of compensation remains unsettled 
largely because organizations struggle to maintain an independent Board 
while simultaneously aligning shareholder and Director interests.49 For 
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires 
extensive disclosure of BOD compensation to allow the market and 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5239 (2012); see also Robert W. Friz & Elizabeth Virgin, 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act—Considerations for Nonprofit Health Care Organizations, 18 HEALTH 
LAW, June 2006, at 1, 5 (“Nonprofit organizations have traditionally been governed by Boards of 
Directors comprised of local unpaid volunteers.”). 
 42. See generally Katherine M. Brown, Note, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking 
Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102 
(2007) (arguing that cash and equity should form the basis of Director compensation). 
 43. Id. at 1114 (comparing Directors to politicians).  
 44. Id. at 1114–15 (noting that “[t]he strongest incentive for directors to ‘do the right thing.’ . . 
. is not so much independence as it is their expertise, diligence, and inherent curiosity” (quoting 
Michael Barrier, The Compensation Balance, INTERNAL AUDITOR, June 2002, at 47)).  
 45. Id. at 1115 (noting one Director who commented that Board members should pay for their 
service because of the education received).  
 46. Id. at 1116.  
 47. See id.  
 48. Id. at 1115–16. While perhaps not the driving force to serve, financial compensation may 
impact the manner in which Directors serve. Id. at 1116. Compensation may further provide a 
psychological link to the organization. See id.   
 49. See id. at 1117.  
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shareholders to monitor and react to an organization’s policy.50 
Shareholders react to whether or not Directors are fulfilling their agency 
roles while the market monitors whether the firm is maximizing its value.51 
Consequently, corporate Board compensation is efficiently captured within 
the marketplace. 
There are two primary means of compensating Directors and each one 
has its shortcomings.52 First, firms may pay Directors directly in cash.53 
This practice maintains the Board’s independence from shareholders and 
managers and reduces conflicts of interest, as Directors are less likely to 
consider the financial impact of their decisions on the company.54 Second, 
firms often alternatively offer Directors equity either through direct shares 
of stock or through stock options.55 Equity compensation theoretically 
reduces agency costs as the interests of Directors are aligned with 
shareholders.56 Those aligned interests, however, can result in too “cozy” of 
a relationship that could lead to earnings management and other ethical 
breaches.57 Additionally, a third alternative method of compensating 
Directors ties compensation to performance.58 However, as Directors set 
their own performance goals, potential conflicts of interest are readily 
apparent.59 Further, the practice of Directors sharing identical performance 
goals as managers or officers of the corporation reduces the independence 
of the Board.60 
Charitable volunteer associations throughout the colonial and early state 
period generally did not compensate Board members, a traditional practice 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 1118.  
 52. Id. at 1121–26.  
 53. See id. at 1121–22.  
 54. Brown, supra note 42, at 1121–22. In a riskier marketplace, Directors often prefer the 
security of cash compensation. Id.  
 55. Id. at 1122–23; see Tom Johansmeyer, Board of Directors are Doing More to Earn Their 
Keep, DAILY FIN., (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/12/18/boards-of-directors-
are-doing-more-to-earn-their-keep/.  
 56. See Brown, supra note 42, at 1124. 
 57. Caroline A. Antonacci, Note, SAB 99: Combating Earnings Management with a 
Qualitative Standard of Materiality, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 75, 76 (2001). Earnings management 
arises when “[e]xecutives, accountants, and auditors contribut[e] to the wide-spread use of 
creative accounting gimmicks [that] are motivated by inflated earnings targets, judicial and 
legislative pronouncements retracting accountants’ liability, and executive compensation plans 
triggered by upward momentum in stock price.” Id. 
 58. Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation 
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 228 n.3 (1999) 
(“Although having a significant portion of an executive's pay take the form of contingent 
compensation is a relatively recent phenomenon, pay for performance is not a new idea. Some say 
that the philosophy of linking pay to performance dates back to the Protestant Reformation of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”). 
 59. See Brown, supra note 42, at 1131.  
 60. Id.  
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that prevailed well into the late twentieth century.61 In particular, health care 
nonprofits have traditionally relied upon volunteer community and business 
leaders to serve as Directors; yet, during the last twenty-five years, the 
permissive practice of compensating Directors has ushered in a new era.62 
The justification for this permissive practice largely stems from the 
complex nature of the healthcare industry and the perceived competition for 
qualified Directors.63 The mission of all healthcare organizations is to 
finance and deliver healthcare services; however, the distinction between 
for-profit and nonprofit healthcare organizations is less clear because both 
offer similar services with an identical mission of caring for patients.64 
Appendix A illustrates 2010 Director compensation data for the top ten 
organizations by assets within four categories: all industry nonprofits, all 
industry for-profits, healthcare nonprofits, and healthcare for-profits.65 In 
the top ten nonprofit healthcare industry classification, seven out of ten 
organizations compensated their Boards while only forty-one out of 229 
individual Directors within that classification received compensation. 
Furthermore, within the top ten healthcare nonprofits, the average salary 
paid per Director who received compensation was $79,799, and $14,287 per 
Director inclusive of Directors who received no compensation. In the all 
industry nonprofit class, twenty-three out of 160 Directors received 
compensation with an average of $147,276 paid per Director who received 
compensation, and $12,170.90 per Director inclusive of Directors who 
received no compensation. In comparison, for-profit healthcare Directors 
received an average of $259,556 annually. 
C. FIDUCIARY DUTY 
A nonprofit Board’s fiduciary duties and ethical governance obligations 
ultimately run to those segments of the public for whose benefit the 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See supra notes 30 (founding of Harvard), 31 (describing the Mayflower compact), 34 
(providing judicial clarification in the Dartmouth case), 38 (showing the changes brought about by 
the Amory case) and accompanying text. 
 62. Compare Nicole Huberfeld, Tackling the “Evils” of Interlocking Directorates in 
Healthcare Nonprofits, 85 NEB. L. REV. 681, 687 (2007) with REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. 
ACT § 8.12 (1987) (permitting nonprofit Director compensation). 
 63. Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.   
 64. Id.  
 65. See Appendix A, infra pp. 28–32. Further, studies suggest that the healthcare nonprofit 
industry operates more efficiently than the for-profit industry. See Steffie Woolhander & David U. 
Himmelstein, When Money Is the Mission – The High Costs of Investor-Owned Care, 341 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 444, 445–46 (1999); Pauline V. Rosenau & Stephen H. Linder, Two Decades of 
Research Comparing For-Profit and Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the United States, 
84 SOC. SCI. Q. 219, 219, 224 (2003). In the healthcare industry, the distinction between for-profit 
organizations and their nonprofit counterparts is less clear because both offer similar services with 
the identical mission of caring for patients. William C. Kellough, Affiliations, Sales, and 
Conversion Involving Non-Profit and For-Profit Healthcare Organizations in Oklahoma, 33 
TULSA L.J. 521, 522–23 (1997). 
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organization’s charitable purpose was created.66 Nonprofit Directors fulfill 
these duties by governing with due care, loyalty, and obedience.67 
Furthermore, the Board must execute its leadership role in a way that 
strengthens the nonprofit mission and financial integrity throughout all 
levels of the organization.68 The states’ power to police BOD fiduciary 
responsibilities generally rests with the Office of the State AG, most often 
through its public charities or consumer protection divisions.69 Hence, due 
to this minimal oversight, the BOD’s responsibility to set the appropriate 
fiduciary tone at the top of the nonprofit organization and to govern in a 
manner that preserves the public trust are of paramount importance.70 
Nonprofit BOD’s fiduciary duties support the public trust by placing 
the public’s interest first and foremost.71 Unlike for-profit Directors, 
nonprofit Directors’ fiduciary duty directly encompasses multiple 
stakeholders’ interests rather than focusing on the narrower interests of 
shareholders, since the nonprofit organization’s goal is not to maximize 
profits for shareholders.72 Rather, the purpose of nonprofit BOD fiduciary 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Lesley Rosenthal, Nonprofit Corporate Governance: The Board’s Role, THE HARVARD L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 15, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu 
/corpgov/2012/04/15/nonprofit-corporate-governance-the-boards-role/#more-27827; see also 
Tracy G. Landauer & Harry J. Friedman, How to Be a Responsible Nonprofit Director: Do’s and 
Don’ts—Avoiding Punishment for Good Deeds, GREENBERG TRAURIG ALERT 1–4 (Nov. 2005), 
http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2005/1102.pdf. 
 67. See Gary R. Pannone, Board Governance and the Non-Profit Organization, PANNONE 
LOPES DEVEREAUX & WEST LLC, http://www.pldw.com/Knowledge-and-Resource-Center 
/PLDW-Board-Governance.pdf (last visited April 21, 2013) (defining the duties, responsibilities 
and management structure of the nonprofit board); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-6-22 (2012) (outlining the 
duties of the board of directors); see also Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 
N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999).    
 68. See generally Pamela C. Smith, Kerry McTier & Kelly R. Pope, Nonprofit Employees’ 
Machiavellian Propensities, 25 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT 335 (2009) (arguing that 
nonprofit organizations need to take steps at all levels in order to preserve its charitable mission, 
specifically focusing on public information, fiscal control, management, disclosure, and the public 
good). 
 69. See, e.g., The Non-Profit Organizations/Public Charities Division, ATT’Y GEN. OF MASS., 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/bureaus/business-and-labor/the-non-profit-organizations-public-
charities-division/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Public Charities]; Charities, ATT’Y 
GEN. OF CAL., http://oag.ca.gov/charities (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); About the Charities Bureau, 
ATT’Y GEN. OF N.Y., http://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.jsp (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).  
 70. See generally Mark S. Schwartz, Thomas W. Dunfee & Michael J. Kline, Tone at the Top: 
An Ethics Code for Directors?, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 79 (2005) (arguing that Directors play a critical 
ethical role, requiring them to set the tone for their organization’s overall ethics and corporate 
governance programs). 
 71. LARUE TONE HOSMER, THE ETHICS OF MANAGEMENT 116–17 (7th ed., McGraw-Hill 
2011). A fiduciary is defined as “[a] person who is required to act for the benefit of another person 
on all matters within the scope of their relationship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 72. Gary Kirk & Shabnam B. Nolan, Nonprofit Mission Statement Focus and Financial 
Performance, 20 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 473, 477 (2010); see also Woolhander & 
Himmelstein, supra note 65, at 446.  
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duty is solely to fulfill the organization’s charitable mission—a stakeholder-
based purpose to benefit the public.73 
Potentially weakening the connection between nonprofit BOD 
governance policy and the public benefit, the 1987 Revised Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) provides states the opportunity to 
modify fiduciary duties as defined in the RMNCA, and specifically, permits 
the practice of Board compensation.74 The RMNCA accomplishes this by 
relaxing the standard applied to conflicts of interest and self-dealing as 
established in Amory’s Prudent Man Rule,75 moving the Rule closer to 
today’s for-profit Business Judgment rule76 applicable to for-profit 
Boards.77 Yet, while allowing the practice of nonprofit BOD compensation 
arguably alters the tradition of volunteerism,78 the Official Comments to the 
RMNCA provide that BOD compensation must be consistent with the 
fiduciary standards of due care and loyalty.79 Nevertheless, the Model Act 
ushered in a new era of nonprofit governance.80 
The 1987 RMNCA, its subsequent revisions, and most state statutes 
further erode nonprofit BOD’s accountability to the public by failing to 
account for the fiduciary duty of obedience.81 The nonprofit BOD duty of 
obedience may be distinguished from the duties of care and loyalty as it 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Kirk & Nolan, supra note 72. Missions are the revered essence of nonprofits. Id. at 
474.  
 74. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.02, 8.12, 8.30–8.33 (1987) (amended 2008). 
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is an ABA-sponsored model statute for uniform 
nonprofit governance that states may adopt. See id. §§ 1.01, 1.02.  
 75. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.  
 76. Margaret E. McLean, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Takeovers: 
Restraints on the Use of ESOPS by Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert Hostile Takeovers, 
10 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 761 (1983) (“The prudent man requirement is likened to the sound business 
judgment rule applicable to directors of a corporation.”). Under both the nonprofit Best Judgment 
and for-profit Business Judgment Rule, self-serving transactions and conflicts of interest may be 
“permissible as long as the board” is “fully informed” and acts are not “demonstrably contrary to 
the [organization’s] best interest.” See Hall, supra note 21, at 22.  
 77. Hall, supra note 21, at 22.  
 78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 79. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.12 cmt. (1987) (noting Board must comply 
with sections 8.30 through 8.33, which includes duty of care and loyalty in determining Board 
compensation). 
 80. Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1677, 1685 (2009) (“To combat the potential for, and effect of, nonprofit 
governance abuse, an increasing number of states have adopted the Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act.”). 
 81. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: 
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 631 (1998) (addressing duty 
of care and loyalty but not mentioning duty of obedience); see also Huberfeld, supra note 62, at 
703–04, 712 (discussing the fact that only a handful of courts have acknowledged the duty of 
obedience, and that the RMNCA does not address the duty of obedience); Linda Sugin, Resisting 
the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 897 (2007). 
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does not emanate from the nonprofit organization as an organization; rather, 
it arises from the organization’s charitable purpose or mission as described 
in its articles of incorporation and bylaws.82 Commentators have suggested 
that limiting enforceable fiduciary duties to only care and loyalty will not 
sustain the public trust.83 This might be especially so considering the 
heightened scrutiny afforded financial fiduciaries in today’s environment 
and may work to empower the Board to all but ignore the nonprofit’s 
charitable goals.84 Consequently, the duty of obedience’s absence directly 
undermines Bacon’s admonition that the Board’s true responsibility is 
obedience to the public good to secure against mismanagement and the 
perversion of the public trust.85 
Moreover, the duty of obedience plays a critical and different role from 
the duty of care and loyalty since those duties are closely aligned with 
market efficiencies.86 The duty of obedience maintains that Directors are 
unbound by market forces in making strategic organizational decisions.87 
Instead, the societal concerns of the organization’s founders as outlined in 
the charitable mission contained in its articles of incorporation and bylaws 
guide the decision making of Directors.88 For example, in Manhattan Eye, 
Ear & Throat Hospital v. Spitzer, the court considered whether the sale of a 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Douglas Y. Park, To Whom Does the Nonprofit Board of Directors Owe Fiduciary 
Duties?, DYP ADVISORS (Feb. 12, 2013), www.dypadvisors.com/2012/04/16/to-whom-does-
nonprofit-board-of-directors-owe-fiduciary-duties/. Directors’ fiduciary duties within nonprofits 
extend to both the corporation and to the public. Huberfeld, supra note 62, at 699. However, it is 
the duty of obedience that fixes the public benefit as articulated by the nonprofit’s charitable 
mission. Id. The duty of obedience originated in the law of trusts, which requires the trustee to 
administer trust assets according to the express wishes of both the creator and donors. See Sugin, 
supra note 81, at 898. For nonprofit charities, Board members must make every decision in order 
“to advance the nonprofit’s purpose” as articulated in the nonprofit’s mission. Danné L. Johnson, 
Seeking Meaningful Nonprofit Reform in a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187, 
200 (2009) (citation omitted). Courts analyze the duty of obedience under one of two approaches: 
first, a narrow approach via an ultra vires interpretation questioning whether or not the Board 
acted outside the scope of the organization’s purpose; and second, a more flexible approach via an 
internal interpretation of how the Directors managed the scope of the organization’s mission. See 
Sugin, supra note 81, at 900–02.  
 83. See Sugin, supra note 81, at 894. Some states do apply the duty of obedience even though 
those states fail to codify it. Id. at 899. This is well illustrated by the recent increase in restricted 
gifts resulting from “charities’ drifting from their . . . purpose or mission.” Benjamin, supra note 
80, at 1677–78. Restricted gifts create a trust, and therefore, their use is even narrower than the 
charitable purpose. Id. at 1680.  
 84. See Sugin, supra note 81, at 894; Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1679–80.  
 85. Compare REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987) (failing to discuss the duty of 
obedience) with Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33 (arguing that the BOD’s true responsibility is to 
obey the public good).  
 86. Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1681.  
 87. Id. at 1682 (observing that, under the duty of obedience, “nonprofits are foremost 
concerned with their mission, which they find inherently valuable and to be considered before 
economics”).   
 88. See id.  
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troubled New York nonprofit hospital violated the Board’s duty of 
obedience.89 The court conceded that eliminating the nonprofit’s mission 
via a dissolution of its assets and establishing a new mission might be 
appropriate to solve financial difficulties;90 however, it cautioned that the 
duty of obedience requires a consideration of whether “[e]mbarkation upon 
a course of conduct which turns it away from the charity’s central and well-
understood mission should be a carefully chosen option of last resort.”91 
Though the nature and scope of nonprofit BOD fiduciary duties have 
been at the forefront of recent discussions of nonprofit reform proposals and 
financial concerns,92 the RMNCA does not impose substantial regulations 
on nonprofits to ensure financial accountability.93 This starkly contrasts 
with laws governing for-profit organizations, which must follow the 
financial accountability requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.94 
Furthermore, little concerted effort to effect regulatory change has been 
proposed for nonprofits,95 while similar action can be observed in other 
sectors. For example, the SEC, the President, and various industry groups 
and leaders have endorsed modifying Broker-Dealer laws to include 
fiduciary duties.96 Yet, in regard to nonprofits, Congress has initiated 
merely two panel reports that express concerns for nonprofit governance, 
fiduciary duty, and other ethical issues such as BOD compensation.97 
Congress has instead relegated to the states the authority to propose 
legislative reforms in these areas to strengthen fiduciary duty for nonprofit 
governance.98 
D. STATE AND FEDERAL REFORMS 
The states exercise primary jurisdiction and regulatory authority over 
nonprofits by governing their legal formation, providing oversight of their 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct.  1999). 
 90. Id. at 595.  
 91. Id.  
 92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 93. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987) (amended 2008). 
 94. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, pmbl., 116 Stat. 745, 745 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 7201) (enacting Sarbanes-Oxley Act “[t]o protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures”). 
 95. Doug Donovan, Nonprofits Need a Strong, Unified Voice to Lobby Government, Report 
Says, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 19, 2012), http://philanthropy.com/article/Nonprofits-
Need-a-Strong/134540/.  
 96. See generally STAFF OF THE SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS (2011) (recommending the implementation of, among others, duties of care and loyalty 
to broker-dealers). In fact, one commentator suggests working toward a “fiduciary society,” where 
those entrusted with other’s money must abide by fiduciary duties imposed by federal statute. 
John Bogle, A Crisis of Ethic Proportions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at A19. 
 97. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 98. See infra notes 114, 69, 104, and accompanying text. 
456 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
operations, and enforcing their fiduciary duties.99 State statutes require 
nonprofits to file articles of incorporation and bylaws which must include 
statements of charitable purpose and mission.100 State AGs, representing the 
interests of the public trust, are the public face of nonprofit accountability, 
transparency, and disclosure.101 They provide oversight of nonprofit 
fiduciary duty, mission, and purpose and enforce state nonprofit law.102 
California spearheads State efforts to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley-like 
requirements of financial integrity for nonprofit organizations103 To wit, the 
California Nonprofit Integrity Act imposes on nonprofit Boards a 
responsibility to exercise heightened oversight over its financial matters.104 
However, while a step in the right direction, the California law has many 
weaknesses. First, California hospitals are exempt from mandatory audit 
and accompanying disclosure requirements.105 Also, while the California 
legislation sets a standard of reasonableness for Board approval of CEO and 
CFO compensation as well as Board compensation, it provides little 
guidance by way of criteria to follow in applying the standard.106 Third, 
while California law prohibits and penalizes nonprofit breaches of the duty 
of loyalty through self-dealing, these restrictions do not apply to 
compensation of Board members who participate in the decision to pay as 
long as the compensation is just and reasonable.107 Finally, even though 
California defines a volunteer Board member as one who is not 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000–10841(2012) (governing nonprofit corporation law); 
see also MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 180 §§ 1–29 (2010) (governing corporations for charitable uses). 
Many states have passed “sunshine laws” that require nonprofits to disclose financial information, 
including revenue and expenditures. Donnelly, supra note 7, at 164 n.8 (citation omitted).  
 100. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5130–5134 (2012). 
 101. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 12, § 8 (2010). 
 102. See supra note 69.  
 103. Donnelly, supra note 7, at 176–77 (noting that California was the first state to legislate 
state-imposed reforms on nonprofit governance); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586(e) (2005) 
(requiring financial reporting and audits for nonprofits with gross revenues of $2 million or more).  
 104. See David Tate, Nonprofit Board Standard of Care, Risk Management, and Audit 
Committee Responsibility, DAVIDTATE.US, 4 (May 19, 2011), http://davidtate.us/files 
/Nonprofit_Board_Standard_of_Care_Risk_Management_and_Audit_Committee_Responsibilitie
s_David_Tate_Esq_051920113.pdf (noting that, while the entire BOD is responsible for 
overseeing nonprofit’s financial statements and accounting system, the BOD may delegate that 
responsibility to an audit committee and, if it receives more than $2 million in gross revenues, 
must have their annual financial statements audited by an independent certified public accountant). 
But cf. NYS Legislative Session, NPCCNY.ORG (Aug. 2005), http://www.npccny.org/info 
/gov_rel_080105b.htm (proposing, unsuccessfully, the “Nonprofits Accountability Bill,” which 
would have imposed Sarbanes-Oxley-like financial controls requirements on nonprofit BODs).  
 105. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12583 (2005); see also Rosemary E. Fei, California’s Nonprofit 
Integrity Act of 2004, ALDER & COLVIN, 5 (Spring 2006), http://www.adlercolvin.com/pdf 
/nonprofit_governance/AC%20Web%20Resource%20--%20CA%20NIA%20of%202004%20 
(00171023).PDF. 
 106. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586(g).  
 107. Blodgett & Melconian, supra note 8, at 197–219.  
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compensated, it permits Director reimbursement by the nonprofit for 
expenses incurred.108 
In terms of nonprofit BOD compensation, Illinois, California, Texas, 
and Virginia explicitly authorize modest compensation of nonprofit Boards 
in their statutory codes.109 Illinois, for example, has increased the amount of 
nonprofit compensation a Director can receive without losing statutory 
limited liability protection from $5,000 to $25,000.110 However, none of the 
statutory provisions of these four states describe standards of reasonable 
compensation for Board members, and none of them provide criteria by 
which to determine the overall justification for BOD compensation.111  
This lack of concrete statutory guidance, and perhaps fueled by the 
1987 RNMCA’s failure to align the nonprofit BOD duty of obedience with 
its respective mission, has led to increased attorney general activism,112 
especially with regard to nonprofit BOD compensation. The Massachusetts 
AG, Martha Coakley (AG Coakley), has been front and center in attempts 
to regulate Massachusetts nonprofits.113 In 2009, AG Coakley undertook a 
study aimed at reviewing nonprofits’ compensation practices with regard to 
independent Directors and focused specifically on the compensation 
practices of four Massachusetts charitable health insurance providers.114 In 
2011, perhaps at least partially in response to AG Coakley’s study, two of 
the four Massachusetts health insurance providers suspended Director 
compensation indefinitely,115 while the other two voted to continue the 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(i) (2010); CAL LAB. CODE § 3363.6(c) (2010); 
Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.  
 109. Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. See id. at 7 (noting the Massachusettes AG’s “vigorous oversight of the nonprofit sector”); 
see also Alice M. Maples, State Attorney General Oversight of Nonprofit Healthcare 
Corporations: Have We Reached an Ideological Impasse?, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 235, 240–41 
(2007). Oversight by State AGs has increased over the last few years. See Patrick Coffey et al., 
The “Charitable Trust” Controversy Confronting Banner Health and Other Nonprofit Healthcare 
Systems, 16 HEALTH LAW. 1, 1 (2003). The various AGs argue that nonprofit corporate assets are 
held in trust for the benefit of the community that a particular nonprofit serves. Id. The competing 
arguments balance a lack of resources and an otherwise lack of regulation. Maples, supra, at 240.  
 113. See Christine McConville, Pols Aim to Ban Money for Nonprofit Boards, BOSTON 
HERALD, May 23, 2011, at 5. 
 114. Press Release, Mass. Att’y Gen. Office, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley 
Announces Enhanced Oversight of Non-Profit Executive and Board Compensation (Sept. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2009/ag-coakley-
announces-enhanced-oversight-of.html. 
 115. Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield, although voting to end its practice of Director 
compensation in 2011, subsequently reinstated this practice in 2013. See Robert Weisman, Blue 
Cross to Pay Board Again, Though at Reduced Level, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2013, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/03/01/blue-cross-blue-shield-massachusetts-reinstate-
board-fees-though-reduced-level/SuPw27Pjg84r1bQ93GWu4M/story.html. Fallon Community 
Health Plan, the other health insurer that suspended its BOD compensation, also reinstated its 
Director compensation practices. Id.    
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practice.116 Shortly after, AG Coakley released a critical and strongly 
negative report on the compensation practices of the two health insurance 
providers that elected to continue compensating their independent 
Directors.117 
In her report, AG Coakley noted that “Compensating [D]irectors is 
contrary to [charitable] spirit and diverts resources otherwise focused on 
achieving the charitable mission of the organization.”118 The report further 
pointed out that an inherent conflict of interest exists with the Board’s self-
determination of compensation.119 Ultimately, as a result of its findings, the 
report submitted two Massachusetts AG initiatives: (1) public disclosure of 
independent Director compensation levels, as well as the basis and rationale 
for such compensation; and (2) specific legislation authorizing AG-
determination of justifiable compensation.120 
In May 2011, AG Coakley filed legislation aimed at prohibiting the 
continued practice of compensating independent Directors of public 
charities.121 The Bill proposes that “[n]o Massachusetts based public charity 
. . . shall provide compensation to any independent officer, [D]irector or 
trustee for service . . . except with the approval of the Director [of the AG’s 
public charities division]. . . . Any such public charity intending to provide 
[such] compensation . . . shall file an application . . . requesting the 
approval of the Director.”122 The Bill further permits the AG to develop 
criteria for granting its approval through rules and regulations.123 The 
legislation, however, remained in committee at the end of the formal 2012 
legislative session and its future passage is uncertain.124 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See Spackman Letter, supra note 24, at 1; see also Robert Weisman, Insurer’s Board 
Suspends Own Pay, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare 
/articles/2011/03/09/blue_cross_board_suspends_its_own_pay/.   
 117. See generally Spackman Letter, supra note 24 (criticizing the compensation practices of 
Tufts Health Plan and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care).   
 118. Id. at 2. 
 119. Id. at 2–3.  
 120. Id. at 5–6.  
 121. Bill H. 3516, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House 
/H3516 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Bill H. 3516]. 
 122. H.B. 3516, 187th Leg. (Mass. 2011).  
 123. Id. § 1, sec. 8F½(b). The AG has developed regulations in which the office has established 
a rebuttable presumption standard. See also HOSMER, supra note 71.  
 124. See H.R. 3515, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011), available at http://www 
.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H3516. AG Coakley’s report and legislative proposal invited 
critical comments and strong opposition. See, e.g., Attorney General Coakley’s Latest Proposal 
Could Drive Foundations and Their Money Out of Massachusetts, CHARITY GOVERNANCE 
CONSULTING (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.charitygovernance.com/charity_governance/2011/04 
/attorney-general-coakleys-latest-proposal-could-drive-foundations-and-their-money-our-of-
massachusetts.html#more [hereinafter CHARITY GOVERNANCE CONSULTING]. For example, some 
argued that the legislation is merely a political reaction to a problem that does not exist. Id. 
Furthermore, the article pointed out a potential constitutional challenge under the freedom of 
association. Id. Critics also noted several potential unintended results including the potential that 
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In addition to state government, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also 
exercises oversight over nonprofits.125 Recent revisions in IRS Forms 990 
and 1023, the forms with which all nonprofit corporations must comply to 
secure their tax-exempt status,126 require more reporting transparency and 
disclosures.127 The IRS proposes nine principles of good governance for 
nonprofits, including Principal 8, which governs payment of reasonable 
Board and executive compensation.128 Principle 8 cautions that charities 
should refrain from compensating Directors, but nonetheless allows 
Director compensation “when determined appropriate by a committee 
composed of persons who are not compensated by the charity and have no 
financial interest in the determination.”129 Principle 8 also directs readers to 
various parts of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, but 
fails to identify little additional criteria apart to those mentioned in the Code 
and Regulations that are unique to Board member compensation.130 
Furthermore, these nine principles include “satisfaction” requirements for 
                                                                                                                 
nonprofits would move out of Massachusetts and an increased number of side deals for talent 
would occur as former board members became paid consultants. Id.  
 125. Blodgett & Melconian, supra note 8, at 197–219. This special tax-exempt status is granted 
because nonprofits commit their net earnings to public purpose and benefit. See Pamela C. Smith 
& Kelly A. Richmond, Call for Greater Accountability Within the U.S. Nonprofit Sector, 11 
ACAD. ACCT. & FIN. STUD. J. 75, 76–77 (2007). Additionally, they must adhere to the language of 
the 1969 Tax Reform Act, which provides “rigorous registration, reporting, and accountability 
requirements.” See Hall, supra note 21, at 21.  
 126. Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should States Force 
Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831, 852 (2007) (stating 
that Form 990 must be filed in order to preserve tax-exempt status); C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin 
A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable 
Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 442 (1995) (stating that 
Form 1023 must be filed to preserve tax-exempt status). 
 127. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases Discussion Draft of Redesigned Form 
990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations (June 14, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-
Releases-Discussion-Draft-of-Redesigned-Form-990-for-Tax-Exempt-Organizations. Steuerle & 
Sullivan, supra note 126. But see Donnelly, supra note 7, at 180, 188 (noting that the IRS lacks 
legislative authority from Congress to regulate nonprofit governance). 
 128. The nine principles of good governance for nonprofits proposed by the IRS are 
(1) Adoption of a Mission Statement, (2) Adoption of a Code of Ethics and 
Whistleblower policies, (3) Satisfaction of the Duty of Care/Director Diligence, (4) 
Satisfaction of the Duty of Loyalty/effective conflicts of interest oversight, (5) 
Constituent transparency, (6) Oversight of fund-raising activity, (7) Stewardship of 
financial affairs, (8) Payment of reasonable compensation; and (9) Adoption of a 
document retention policy. 
IRS Releases Suggested Governance Guidelines for Tax-Exempt Organizations, MCDERMOTT 
WILL & EMERY (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST 
=PublicationDetail&pub=6137; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., GOOD GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
FOR 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS [hereinafter GOOD GOVERNANCE], available at http://www 
.mwe.com/info/news/IRS0207.pdf.  
 129. GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 128, at 4. 
 130. Id.; 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6 (2002).  But see Treas Reg. § 53.4958-6 (noting factors and 
examples supporting rebuttable presumption of the reasonableness of compensation). 
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evaluation of Board performance of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty; yet 
they are silent on the fiduciary duty of obedience.131 
Prior to the annual filing of Form 990, nonprofits must file an initial 
Form 1023 in order to receive a federal tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).132 
In 2004, the IRS amended Form 1023 and developed a new list of questions 
as a result of its survey of perceived executive and Board abuses.133 These 
questions address BOD pay and other compensation issues.134 Others have 
noted that, 
[w]hile the Form 1023 prior to the current version asked questions 
regarding organization structure and governance, it principally focused on 
the charitable activities of the organization. In contrast, the 2004 . . . 
version places an increased emphasis on an organization’s governance by 
                                                                                                                 
 131. GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 128, at 4. 
 132. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1023 (rev. 2006) [hereinafter 2006 FORM 1023]; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 (2012). Treasury regulations provide that nonprofits must 
make their Form 990 and Form 1023, along with the IRS determination letter readily available for 
public inspection by request or by posting on the Internet. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6104(d)-1(a), 
301.6104(d)-2(a), (b)(2) (2012). However, only the IRS has standing to bring an action against the 
nonprofit for failure to comply with the disclosure requirement. Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a 
Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 
50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1129 n.223 (2001). Commentators have suggested that regulation should 
require nonprofits to post these forms on the nonprofit’s webpage. Carter G. Bishop, The 
Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of 
Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701, 776 (2008). 
 133. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Revises Application Form for Charitable 
Organizations (Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Revises-Application-
Form-for-Charitable-Organizations; Friz & Virgin, supra note 41, at 7.  
 134. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1023, at 3 (rev. 2004) [hereinafter 2004 FORM 1023]. 
Part V of the revised Form 1023 asks  
[1] Do you or will the individuals that approve compensation arrangements follow a 
conflict of interest policy? [2] Do you or will you approve compensation arrangements 
in advance of paying compensation? [3] Do you or will you document in writing the 
date and terms of approved compensation arrangements? [4] Do you or will you record 
in writing the decision made by each individual who decided or voted on compensation 
arrangements? [5] Do you or will you approve compensation arrangements based on 
information about compensation paid by similarly situated taxable or tax-exempt 
organizations for similar services, current compensation surveys compiled by 
independent firms, or actual written offers from similarly situated organizations? . . . . 
[6] Do you or will you record in writing both the information on which you relied to 
base your decision and its source? . . . . [7] [Has your organization] adopted a conflicts 
of interest policy consistent with the [IRS] sample conflict of interest policy . . . ? . . . . 
[8] What procedures will you follow to assure that persons who have a conflict of 
interest will not have influence over you for setting their own compensation? [9] What 
procedures will you follow to assure that persons who have a conflict of interest will 
not have influence over you regarding business deals with themselves? 
Id. at 3–4 (emphasis in original).  
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focusing on [B]oard and management relationships (independence) as well 
as compensation and other potential opportunities for inurement.135  
This proactive shift has made it more difficult for nonprofits to submit 
fraudulent responses because of the specificity of the questions.136 For 
example, in order to address the BOD’s fiduciary duty as it pertains to 
compensation, question 5b of Part V of the 2004 Form 1023 poses, “What 
procedures will you follow to assure that persons who have a conflict of 
interest will not have influence over you for setting their own 
compensation?”137 
In two separate reports, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (the Panel)—
a panel convened in 2004 at the encouragement of the Senate Finance 
Committee for the purpose of preparing recommendations to Congress and 
the IRS to improve the oversight and governance of charitable and 
nonprofit organizations—urged nonprofit Board leadership to strengthen its 
governance and ethics principles with more disclosure, accountability, and 
transparency, and developed hundreds of recommendations for Congress 
and the IRS to improve its laws, education efforts, and enforcement.138 
Particularly, the Panel’s 2007 Report identified a number of nonprofit best 
practices.139 Among the items, it included Principle 20, which states the 
presumption that “Board members are generally expected to serve without 
compensation,” noting that in most cases compensation may not be 
appropriate.140 However, despite this general presumption, it explicitly 
acknowledges that nonprofit charitable organizations may pay reasonable 
Board compensation when “appropriate” to do so.141 
While Principle 20 discusses a mechanism for determining reasonable 
compensation and suggests that Board compensation may be consistent 
with governance best practices in certain instances, it fails to identify those 
instances and proposes no criteria for determining what constitutes an 
appropriate justification for compensating Directors.142 Rather, Principle 20 
allows for Director compensation so long as it is “reasonable and necessary 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a 
Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 207–08 (2012). 
 136. See id. at 208 (citation omitted).  Further, the proactive approach permits the IRS to rely 
less heavily on audit procedures. Id. (citation omitted).  
 137. 2004 FORM 1023, supra note 134, at 4.  
 138. See STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 3, at preface, 4–8; PANEL ON THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE 
FOR CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS, preface, 5 (2007) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; About the Panel 
on the Nonprofit Sector, NONPROFITPANEL.ORG, http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/Index.html 
(last visited May 26, 2013). 
 139. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 8–27. 
 140. Id. at 19; see also Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.  
 141. PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 19.  
 142. Id.; see also Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.  
462 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
to support the performance of the organization in its exempt function.”143 
Consequently, nonprofits should rely on state nonprofit corporation statutes, 
expressing clear legislative intent, that authorize payment of Board 
compensation without State oversight.144 These statutes leave it up to the 
nonprofit Board to act in the best interests of the organization.145 Unlike for-
profit Boards in which the owners, stockholders, and investors of the 
organization provide oversight of Board actions, nonprofit Boards are not 
subject to organizational stakeholder oversight of Board decisions to 
compensate themselves.146 Thus, only the State AGs, who represent the 
public interest, have oversight, albeit limited, to police nonprofit Board 
actions. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. NONPROFIT DIRECTOR COMPENSATION MAY BE UNETHICAL 
AND MAY VIOLATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Nonprofit BOD compensation raises issues of conflict of interest and 
may compromise the fiduciary duties of due care, loyalty, and obedience.147 
State AGs supervise nonprofit Boards’ management and may bring 
enforcement actions for breaches of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.148 
For healthcare nonprofits especially, the Board must be loyal to the 
nonprofit and obedient to the healthcare’s mission to finance and deliver 
healthcare services.149 Directors can satisfy the duty of loyalty to advance 
the best interests of the organization by avoiding conflicts of interest and 
self-dealing.150 Moreover, they can meet their fiduciary duty of obedience 
by advancing and fulfilling the nonprofit’s mission within the scope of the 
organization’s public purpose—not by responding to competitive market 
pressures—as developed in Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital.151 
These duties encompass the preservation of a “great voluntary society” 
benefitting the public good.152 
However, autonomous Board compensation promotes, at the very least, 
the appearance of a conflict of interest and provides a Board the opportunity 
to advance its own self interests to the detriment of the nonprofit’s 
                                                                                                                 
 143. PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 19.  
 144. Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6, at 2–3 (discussing Illinois and California law). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 148. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
 149. See Huberfeld, supra note 62, at 701–04.  
 150. See id. at 701–02.   
 151. Id. at 703–04, 706–08; see also Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 
N.Y.S.2d 575, 597 (Sup. Ct.1999). 
 152. See Bacon, supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
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mission.153 “[D]irectors of a large charity may be more likely to consider 
the advantages to themselves of doing business with the charity than to 
view self-dealing transactions as a way to help the charity.”154 Self-interest 
violates the Baconian ethical requirement to obey the charitable mission and 
fulfill the public benefit, which in turn compromises the public trust.155 
Furthermore, Board compensation without obedience to its mission 
weakens the purpose of the nonprofit’s existence.156 A Board that engages 
in Board compensation may not be acting within the highest moral and 
ethical standards even though it meets legal standards of reasonableness and 
the appropriate level of due care.157 Consequently, this permissive practice 
undermines, as Bacon pointed out, the ethical “security against 
mismanagement and [promotes] the gradual perversion of the trust. . . . 
Great perversions of trusts . . . occur . . . for the most part unconsciously, 
gradually, and with the best intentions.”158 
Today’s relaxation of nonprofit fiduciary standards appears to pull 
nonprofit Boards in two opposing directions: (1) meeting lofty public 
expectations tied to Bacon’s historical high moral standards and 
perceptions; and (2) being legally required to meet only a Best Judgment 
Rule, a fiduciary standard that is analogous to the for-profit standard of 
business judgment.159 This modified standard does not secure against 
mismanagement; it fails to prevent self-dealing and conflicts of interest. It 
creates the slippery slope Bacon warned would lead to a perversion of the 
public trust. Tightening nonprofit fiduciary duty to an outright prohibition 
of any self-dealing or conflicts of interest would help to differentiate it from 
the for-profit Business Judgment Rule and restore the more rigorous 
standards of the past.160 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See Spackman Letter, supra note 24, at 2–3.  
 154. Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and 
Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 637 (1999).  
 155. See Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33.  
 156. See Kirk & Nolan, supra note 72.  
 157. See Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33; REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987); Kirk & 
Nolan, supra note 72, at 473–90.  
 158. Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33; see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 19. 
 159. Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1694 (discussing the similarities between the for-profit and 
nonprofit best judgment rule); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981) 
(describing the modern for-profit “business judgment” rule). 
 160. See Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1694; Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 784 n.10; REV. MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (1987) (amended 2008). The 1987 RMNCA abandoned the 
strict trust standard of the “prudent man” for the more flexible and lenient corporate standard of 
“business judgment.” REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. Under the trust standard, 
board self-dealing and conflicts of interest are “strictly prohibited”; under the corporate standard, 
such Director transactions are “permissible as long as the board [is] fully informed” and the 
members are not “demonstrably contrary to the nonprofit’s best interest[s].” Hall, supra note 21, 
at 22.  
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Perhaps the Massachusetts AG Final Report to the public discussed in 
Part I-D reflects Bacon’s moral admonition to nonprofit Boards to avoid 
perversion of the public trust.161 It’s finding that Director compensation at 
the nonprofits under investigation “fail[ed] to meet the standard of good 
governance that [the Massachusetts AG’s office] believe[d] should be 
expected of a public charity” while still permitting nonprofits to 
compensate Directors if they have a “clear and convincing rationale” for 
doing so certainly corroborates the observation that the permissive practice 
of Board compensation may adhere to Directors’ fiduciary duties under 
limited circumstances.162 However, it further suggests that BOD 
compensation may exacerbate the ethical tension that pulls nonprofit 
Boards in opposing directions. The recent legislative proposal submitted by 
the Massachusetts AG partially addresses such ethical tension.163 It grants 
authority to the Massachusetts AG to determine the merits of Board 
compensation under a “clear and convincing” standard.164 However, it does 
not provide specific criteria to determine justifiable compensation.165 
Any proposal to determine nonprofit Board compensation should 
consider adherence to the charitable mission as the litmus test for today’s 
nonprofit regulatory reforms. Ethical traditions of rigorous individual Board 
responsibility, volunteerism, and adherence to mission serve the public and 
the fiduciary duties of due care, loyalty, and obedience.166 As such, those 
duties may preclude BOD compensation if the practice of BOD 
compensation subverts its commitment to its charitable mission or 
otherwise results from a conflict of interest. 
An inherent conflict of interest exists when a Board determines its own 
compensation.167 In the for-profit context, transparency and disclosure 
reduce the conflict because shareholders react by replacing Board members, 
filing derivative lawsuits, or developing shareholder proposals.168 For 
example, dissatisfied shareholders may propose that Directors be 
compensated with stock options in lieu of other monetary compensation in 
order to align otherwise divergent interests.169 Further, the marketplace 
reacts to for-profit Board decisions, thereby serving as a “backbone” to such 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Spackman Letter, supra note 24; see Bacon, supra note 1, at 32.  
 162. Spackman Letter, supra note 24, at 5, 6; see also REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT  
§ 8.12 (1987) (allowing Director compensation).  
 163. See H.R. 3515, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011), available at http://www 
.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H3516.  
 164. See id. 
 165. Compare id. with 2004 FORM 1023, supra note 134.   
 166. See supra notes 62 and 68 and accompanying text. 
 167. Johansmeyer, supra note 55.  
 168. Id. (noting a derivative lawsuit by Goldman Sachs shareholders for excessive board 
compensation).  
 169. Id.   
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decisions. On the other hand, as discussed above in Part I.C, state regulation 
has failed to expand standing beyond the AGs’ Office so that, in most 
instances, donors are not able to regulate nonprofits.170 Considering this 
diminished stakeholder oversight in the nonprofit context, and after 
applying the fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty, Board-determined 
BOD compensation may not be justifiable. The practice of permitting 
Director compensation may also violate the fiduciary duty of obedience to 
advance the nonprofit mission.171 
B. BOARD COMPENSATION: BLURRING OF FOR-PROFIT AND 
NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE SECTORS 
The practice of compensating nonprofit Boards may be unethical and 
potentially violative of fiduciary duties, but it also appears to be 
impractical.172 This can be seen through analyzing the critiques levied 
against AG Coakley’s proposed legislation discussed above in Part I-D. In 
addition to the critics’ legal challenges and claims of unintended results, 
critics also asserted familiar free market concerns.173 They noted that 
healthcare is an evolving and highly regulated industry requiring highly 
skilled and compensated Directors.174 They further contended that 
competition with public companies for qualified Board members compels 
healthcare nonprofits to actively compete for Directors, thereby permitting 
the market to drive compensation levels.175 Finally, they claimed that 
Directors’ exorbitant time commitments justify compensation.176 However, 
all of these arguments resonate with for-profit rationales for compensation 
rather than with nonprofit volunteerism and mission. 
AG Coakley responded to these criticisms by noting that there are 
equally complex charitable hospitals that do not pay their Boards.177 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See supra notes 69 and 70; see also Gilkeson, supra note 127, at 852–53.   
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Furthermore, the Massachusetts AG’s Office noted that there was no 
evidence that those Boards do not volunteer a proportionate amount of 
time.178 The data in Appendix A below reveals an additional and perhaps 
more nuanced consideration.179 For-profit healthcare organizations do not 
appear to be in direct competition with their nonprofit counterparts for 
Board members because of the dramatic difference in compensation 
levels.180 More importantly, compensation levels, or lack thereof, should not 
form the basis of competition for qualified Board members in a nonprofit 
setting. 
Director compensation and competitive market forces would suggest 
that Directors choose to serve based upon the level of compensation. A 
brief review of the data, however, suggests otherwise.181 Appendix A 
illustrates that nonprofit healthcare Board members are compensated an 
average of $14,287.25 annually, while for-profit Board members within the 
same industry are compensated an average of $259,556.31 annually.182 This 
disparity in compensation demonstrates that Board service between a 
nonprofit healthcare Board and a for-profit healthcare Board is not in direct 
competition; thus, the rationale for increasing compensation as a means of 
securing qualified Board members has little merit.183 
Free market proponents would argue that nonprofit healthcare Director 
compensation is necessary to attract better-qualified Directors.184 Similar to 
the duty of obedience as described in Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat 
Hospital, better quality healthcare also appears to be immune to competitive 
market pressures.185 For example, several studies reveal that nonprofit 
health providers offer more effective care as compared to for-profit 
providers.186 Obedience to the charitable mission of the nonprofit should 
drive Directors’ decision making, not profit maximization.187 Further, 
enticing Directors with compensation as the driving force may result in a 
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profit-oriented mindset contrary to the nonprofit’s charitable mission and a 
volunteer society.188 
C. RECOMMENDED REGULATORY APPROACH: PERFORMANCE AND 
MISSION 
Compensating nonprofit healthcare Directors may violate long-held 
nonprofit fiduciary principles and blur distinctions between nonprofit and 
for-profit governance.189 As a general practice, therefore, the nonprofit 
healthcare industry should avoid compensating Directors. Instead, nonprofit 
healthcare organizations should consider enhancing and promoting other 
rationales or benefits that motivate individuals to serve on nonprofit Boards. 
After nearly twenty-five years of the permissive practice of Board 
compensation, only 2 percent of nonprofit Board members receive annual 
compensation.190 This minimal participation further suggests that nonprofit 
Board service is not driven by compensation. Clearly, then, it is still the 
charitable mission of the nonprofit that attracts the service of Board 
volunteers.191 One way to attract Directors in the absence of compensation 
is to draft a comprehensive organizational mission that incorporates 
branding of organizational purpose and promotes community prestige.192 
Nonprofits could further promote their respective Directors and place them 
in positions of high visibility. This would make BOD membership a highly 
coveted and privileged experience.193 Such branding and prestige enhances 
organizational mission and avoids conflicts of interest that arise when 
Directors are compensated.194 
This recommendation, however, is undermined as a “best practice” 
when nonprofits elect to compensate their Boards.195 As previously noted, 
there is a vacuum of accountability within the traditional nonprofit fiduciary 
relationship because nonprofits do not have shareholders to enforce 
fiduciary principles.196 The dynamic of this lack of agency control begs the 
question: what is the proper regulatory approach to address nonprofit Board 
compensation in the healthcare industry? 
The federal government has made some progress in establishing 
benchmarks and addressing the myriad of governance abuses within the 
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nonprofit sector.197 For example, both Form 990 and Form 1023 have 
included disclosure requirements for organizations to receive tax-exempt 
status.198 However, Form 1023 is deficient because it does not elicit specific 
responses regarding substance and procedure to the majority of its 
questions.199 For example, nearly every question on the Form 1023 queries 
a “yes” or “no” answer.200 Question 4(d) in the section related to Director 
compensation illustrates this point: “Do you or will you record in writing 
the decision made by each individual who decided or voted on 
compensation arrangements?”201 This lack of qualitative data is not 
sufficient to ferret out improper Board compensation.202 
The enforcement of fiduciary principles of nonprofit governance is left 
to the respective State AGs.203 Moreover, state legislatures should follow 
Massachusetts and enact legislation that establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that Board compensation204  is improper and grants to the AG 
rule-making authority to develop rigid criteria for overcoming that 
presumption. Such proactive state legislative response, closely mirroring 
the proposed Massachusetts legislation, may add sufficient rigor into Form 
1023 and Principle 20 of the 2007 Panel on the Nonprofit Sector’s 
Report.205 
Criteria for overcoming the presumption must focus on the mission in 
relation to Director performance.206 This would directly connect Board 
compensation to its performance in the advancement and fulfillment of the 
nonprofit’s purpose. Further, the level of concern regarding nonprofit Board 
independence should be different from the for-profit healthcare industry. 
Independence in the for-profit sector from meeting financial benchmarks 
for compensation could be problematic because management and Directors 
could manipulate earnings, whereas adhering to the nonprofit’s mission 
does not lend itself to such manipulation. For example, instead of 
permitting nonprofits to compensate Directors on an annual basis at a fixed 
sum, the AG regulations could require nonprofits to present their mission 
along with a metric for achieving that mission. Any permissible Director 
compensation should be directly conditioned upon successfully satisfying 
the metric, thereby properly aligning compensation with the nonprofit’s 
charitable mission. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has traced the ethical and legal history of nonprofit 
governance in the United States, demonstrating a strong ethical foundation 
for what should be today’s measure of nonprofit fiduciary duty. The 
nonprofit Best Judgment Rule is merely analogous to the for-profit 
Business Judgment Rule, thereby allowing virtually no ethical 
differentiation between nonprofit and for-profit governance. In adopting the 
1987 RMNCA Best Judgment Rule, state statutes have failed to alleviate 
this blurring of nonprofit and for-profit fiduciary duty; rather, they have 
contributed to it. 
Today, nonprofit healthcare organizations, as revealed in the data 
contained in Appendix A, compensate their Boards to attract talent, albeit 
on a smaller scale compared to their for-profit counterparts. The current 
permissive practice of Board compensation in the nonprofit healthcare 
industry may be a violation of this duty. Further, justifications for nonprofit 
BOD compensation that rely on the competitive landscape for Directors 
mistakenly analogize nonprofit with for-profit competitive pressures for 
Directorship. This Article concludes by suggesting that nonprofit Board 
compensation should be presumptively prohibited and should only be 
rebutted with a rigorous showing, as determined by the State AG, of how 
such compensation is consistent with Director performance in achieving the 
charitable mission and purpose of the nonprofit organization. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
ALL INDUSTRY DATA: 
2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 All Industry Nonprofits 
 
# of 
Dire-
ctors 
Direc-
tors 
Paid 
Sum of 
Salary 
Average of 
Salary Max Salary 
Min 
Salary 
Aver-
age 
Hour-
s per 
Week 
Education 126 1 $789,000.00 $6,261.90 $789,000.00 $        4.23 
Massachus-
etts Institute 
of 
Technology 
(MA) 8 0 $     $           $     $        5.00 
President 
and Fellows 
of Harvard 
College 
(MA) 5 0 $           $            $        $        5.00 
Stanford 
University 
Board of 
Trustees of 
the Leland 
Stanford Ju 
(CA) 31 0 $           $           $        $       2.00 
Trustees of 
Columbia 
University 
in the City 
of New 
York (NY) 24 1 $789,000.00 $32,875.00 $789,000.00 $        3.00 
Trustees of 
Princeton 
University 
(NJ) 40 0 $           $            $        $        6.23 
Yale 
University 
(CT) 18 0 $           $            $        $        4.72 
Health 34 22 
$2,598,345.
00 $76,421.91 $232,123.00 $        2.66 
Howard 
Hughes 
Medical 
Institute 
(MD) 10 10 $439,582.00 $ 43,958.20 $60,000.00 
$30,83
2.00 3.20 
Kaiser 
Foundation 
Health Plan 
Inc. (CA) 12 12 
$2,158,763.
00 $179,896.92 $232,123.00 
$122,8
65.00 2.43 
Kaiser 
Foundation 
Hospitals 
(CA) 12 0 $          $            $         $       2.43 
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Economic 
Developm-
ent 0 0 $           $            $         $        0.00 
Southwest 
Louisiana 
Business 
Developm-
ent Center 
(LA) 0 0 $          $            $        $       0.00 
Grand 
Total 160 23 
$3,387,345.
00 $21,039.41 $789,000.00 $        3.87 
Note. Kaiser Hospitals and Kaiser Health Plan have the same board 
members; only show compensation for Kaiser Health Plan on Form 990. 
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2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 All Industry For-Profits 
 
# of 
Direc-
tors 
Direc-
tors 
Paid Sum of Salary 
Average of 
Salary 
Max of 
Salary 
Min of 
Salary 
Banking 55 55 $15,061,610.00  $273,847.45  $646,229.00  $18,750.00  
Bank of 
America 12 12 $3,693,762.00  $307,813.50  $646,229.00  
$240,000.0
0  
Citigroup 17 17 $4,232,500.00  $248,970.59  $612,500.00  $18,750.00  
JPMorgan 
Chase 10 10 $2,555,185.00  $255,518.50  $270,185.00  
$245,000.0
0  
Wells Fargo 16 16 $4,580,163.00  $286,260.19  $377,217.00  $41,000.00  
Conglomer
ates 16 16 $4,741,353.00  $296,334.56  $357,251.00  
$151,650.0
0  
General 
Electric 16 16 $4,741,353.00  $296,334.56  $357,251.00  
$151,650.0
0  
Diversified 
Financials 40 40 $10,907,347.00  $272,683.68  $503,287.00  $34,348.00  
Fannie Mae 9 9 $1,685,000.00  $187,222.22  $300,000.00  
$160,000.0
0  
Freddie 
Mac 11 11 $1,791,348.00  $162,849.82  $300,000.00  $34,348.00  
Goldman 
Sachs 
Group 11 11 $4,627,249.00  $420,659.00  $503,287.00  
$199,335.0
0  
Morgan 
Stanley 9 9 $2,803,750.00  $311,527.78  $322,917.00  
$299,583.0
0  
Insurance 13 13 $3,071,659.00  $236,281.46  $521,220.00  $23,750.00  
American 
Intl Group 13 13 $3,071,659.00  $236,281.46  $521,220.00  $23,750.00  
Grand 
Total 124 124 $33,781,969.00  $272,435.23  $646,229.00  $18,750.00  
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Healthcare Data: 
2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 Healthcare Nonprofits 
 
# of 
Direc-
tors 
Dire-
ctors 
Paid 
Sum of 
Salary 
Average of 
Salary 
Max 
Salary 
Min 
Salary 
Avera
ge 
Hours 
per 
week 
Adventist 
Health 
System 
Sunbelt 
Inc (FL) 22 1 $3,091.00  $140.50  $3,091.00  $ 2.77 
Banner 
Health 
(AZ) 12 2 $432,000.00  $36,000.00  $45,000.00  
$27,000.
00  4.00 
Catholic 
Healthcar
e West 
(AZ) 15 1 $43,804.00  $2,920.27  $43,804.00  $ 3.53 
Cleveland 
Clinic 
Foundati-
on (OH) 92  $ $ $ $ 2.80 
Howard 
Hughes 
Medical 
Institute 
(MD) 10 1 $439,582.00  $43,958.20  $60,000.00  
$30,832.
00  3.20 
Kaiser 
Foundati-
on Health 
Plan Inc 
(CA) 12 2 
$2,158,763.0
0  $179,896.92  
$232,123.0
0  
$122,865
.00  2.43 
Kaiser 
Foundati-
on 
Hospitals 
(CA) 12 0 $ $ $ $ 2.43 
Memorial 
Sloan-
Kettering 
Cancer 
Center 
(NY) 31 0 $ $ $ $ 1.42 
Shriners 
Hospitals 
for 
Children 
(FL) 12 1 $111,540.00  $9,295.00  
$111,540.0
0  $ 6.25 
Trinity 
Health 
Corporat-
ion (MI) 11 4 $83,000.00  $7,545.45  $25,000.00  $ 2.00 
Grand 
Total 229 41 
$3,271,780.0
0  $14,287.25  
$232,123.0
0  $ 2.84 
Note. Kaiser Hospitals and Kaiser Health Plan have the same board 
members; only show compensation for Kaiser Health Plan on Form 990. 
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2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 Health For-profits 
 
# of 
Dire-
ctors 
Dire-
ctors 
Paid Sum of Salary 
Average of 
Salary 
Max of 
Salary 
Min of 
Salary 
Baxter 
International 12 12 $2,552,377.00  $212,698.08  $227,228.00  
$203,228.0
0  
Becton, 
Dickinson 13 13 $2,847,982.00  $219,075.54  $241,920.00  $91,942.00  
Boston 
Scientific 13 13 $2,985,182.00  $229,629.38  $633,650.00  $27,382.00  
Cigna 11 11 $4,959,691.00  $450,881.00  
$2,398,849.0
0  
$240,208.0
0  
Community 
Health 
Systems 7 7 $1,375,042.00  $196,434.57  $235,007.00  $20,000.00  
Express 
Scripts 11 11 $2,833,000.00  $257,545.45  $277,000.00  
$244,000.0
0  
Humana 10 10 $2,793,982.00  $279,398.20  $562,340.00  
$212,516.0
0  
Medco Health 8 8 $2,213,312.00  $276,664.00  $297,789.00  
$257,789.0
0  
Stryker 8 8 $2,228,293.00  $278,536.63  $308,721.00  
$222,246.0
0  
Thermo Fisher 12 12 $2,464,552.00  $205,379.33  $385,023.00  $4,889.00  
Grand Total 105 105 $27,253,413.00  $259,556.31  
$2,398,849.0
0  $4,889.00  
 
 
 
 
 
